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Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts

FATMA E. MAROUF*
ABSTRACT

This Article highlights the importance of implicit bias in immigration
adjudication. After tracing the evolution of prejudice in our immigration
laws from explicit "old-fashioned" prejudice to more subtle forms of
"modem" and "aversive" prejudice, the Article argues that the specific
conditions under which immigration judges decide cases render them
especially prone to the influence of implicit bias. Specifically, it examines
how factors such as immigration judges' lack of independence, limited
opportunity for deliberate thinking, low motivation, and the low risk of
judicial review all allow implicit bias to drive decisionmaking. The Article
then recommends certain reforms, both simple and complex, to help
reduce such bias in immigration adjudication.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; J.D. Harvard University;
B.A. Yale University. I would like to thank Professor Ann C. McGinley and Professor Jean
Sternlight for their thoughtful comments on this piece. I would also like to thank the New
England Law Review staff for organizing the Symposium on immigration reform and for their
valuable editorial contributions.
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INTRODUCTION
uring the past two decades there has been a surge of research on
implicit bias within the fields of social psychology, cognitive
science, and neuroscience) Implicit bias is largely automatic and
occurs below the level of conscious awareness.2 Legal scholars have
examined the relevance of implicit bias to areas such as employment
discrimination, 3 legislative efforts, 4 and legal decision making.5 Yet its
relevance to immigration law remains largely unexplored. This Article
represents an initial step toward examining the role of implicit bias within
immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or
"Board"), which comprise the administrative levels of immigration
adjudication within the Executive Office for Immigration Review

I For a review of the scientific research on implicit bias, see generally B. Keith Payne &

Bertram Gawronski, A History of Implicit Social Cognition: Where Is It Coming From? Where Is It
Now? Where Is It Going?, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT,
THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 1 (Bertram Gawronski & B. Keith Payne eds., 2010) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION]. For examples of law review articles discussing
the implicit bias research, see generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1489 (2005); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1071-78 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T.
Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006).
2 Payne & Gawronski, supranote 1, at 5.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV.
L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 479 (2007) (responding to the critique of implicit bias evidence as
scientifically invalid and noting that "the case for using the law to respond to the problem of
implicit bias remains strong"); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 969, 972 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1186-1217 (1995); Michael Semi, Response to Professor Wax, Discriminationas Accident: Old
Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1234 (1999) (maintaining that it is well settled that
discrimination law can and should respond to subtle forms of discrimination, including those
exposed by implicit bias research). Some legal scholarship refers to "unconscious" bias, rather
than "implicit" bias. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of DiscriminatoryIntent Under Title VII:
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1982);
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 743
(2005); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331-36 (1987); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva la Evoluci6n!: Recognizing
Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 417-18 (2000).
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 1, at 1545-72.
See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 347 (2007) ("Judges and jurors may unintentionally and
automatically 'misremember' facts in racially biased ways during all facets of the legal
decisionmaking process.").
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("EOIR").6 While all judges have biases by virtue of being human, the
specific conditions under which immigration judges ("IJs") decide cases
render them especially prone to undue influence by implicit bias. This
Article argues that comprehensive immigration reform must address these
conditions in order to provide a basic platform for just adjudication of
immigration cases. Creating the conditions for careful, conscious
examination of complex immigration cases is necessary to improve the
quality of immigration decisions at the administrative level, which Judge
Posner, in particular has repeatedly excoriated as "arbitrary, unreasoned,
7
irrational, inconsistent, and uninformed."
Part I traces the evolution of prejudice in our immigration laws from
explicit "old-fashioned" prejudice to more subtle forms of "modem" and
"aversive" prejudice, providing examples of these various attitudes in both
immigration policy and adjudication of individual immigration cases. Part
II delves deeper into the issue of implicit bias, examining how our current
structure for adjudicating immigration cases allows such bias to flourish
with few cognitive safeguards. Specifically, it examines how IJs' lack of
independence, limited opportunity for deliberate thinking, low motivation,
complex caseload, and the low risk of review all allow implicit bias to drive
decisionmaking. This section also examines similar factors that promote
implicit decisionmaking by the BIA. Part III explores how certain reforms,
both simple and complex, may reduce implicit bias by both IJs and the BIA.
The Article concludes that implicit bias plays a critical role in shaping
administrative immigration adjudication and therefore, EOIR reform
should be a fundamental feature of any sound comprehensive immigration
reform bill.
I.

From "Old-Fashioned" to "Modem" and "Aversive" Prejudice in
U.S. Immigration Law

U.S. immigration laws mirror the "dramatic change in the nature of
8
prejudice and discrimination" that characterizes the last century.

Appeals of BIA decisions in removal cases are filed with the U.S. courts of appeal. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(2) (2006).
Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1679-80
(2007) (summarizing Judge Posner's rebukes of immigration court decisions) (internal
citations omitted). Judge Posner has famously complained that "the adjudication of
[immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of
legal justice." Id. at 1679 (quoting Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005));
accord Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 514 (4th Cir. 2008) (surveying circuit court criticism of
BIA and IJs' opinions).
'James M. Jones, Mechanisms for Coping with Victimization: Self-Protection Plus SelfEnhancement, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FwrY YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 155, 168 (John F.
Dovidio et al., eds., 2005); see also Adam R. Pearson et al., The Nature of ContemporaryPrejudice:
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Psychologists use the term "old-fashioned prejudice" to describe "nonegalitarian beliefs, such as the endorsement of negative stereotypes,
support for segregation and open discrimination, and belief in the
inferiority of particular social groups." 9 The early history of U.S.
immigration law is replete with examples of open and blatant oldfashioned racism, such as: the Naturalization Act of 1790, which limited
U.S. citizenship to free whites;10 the exclusion of Chinese immigrants and
other "Asians" during the late 19th to mid-20th century;" the deportation
of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans, many of whom were U.S. citizens,
during the 1930s;12 and the National Quota system, which remained in
place until 1965.13 Indeed, the unflinchingly racist remarks of Supreme
Court justices in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (the Chinese Exclusion Case)
14
shock the modem conscience.
Although old-fashioned prejudice rarely appears in contemporary
legal opinions, especially at the appellate level, it occasionally still rears its
head in immigration courts. For example, appellate court judges have
rebuked IJs for "launch[ing] into a diatribe against Chinese immigrants
lying on the witness stand, spanning twelve pages of transcript," 5 telling
an asylum applicant, "the whole world does not revolve around you and
the other Indonesians that just want to live here because they enjoy the

Insightsfrom Aversive Racism, 3 Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 314, 315-16 (2009).
1 Paula M. Brochu et al., Cognitive Consistency and the Relation Between Implicit and Explicit
Prejudice: Reconceptualizing Old-Fashioned,Modern, and Aversive Prejudice, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF MODERN PREJUDICE 27,29 (Melanie A. Morrison & Todd G. Morrison eds., 2008).
"IAn Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3 § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790)
(repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20 § 1, 1 Stat. 414).
11Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943,
ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600); see also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE (10th anniversary ed. 2006) (discussing the historical exclusion of Asians from U.S.
citizenship); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 37-40 (2004) (discussing, inter alia, the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907,
which prevented the immigration of Japanese laborers, and the 1924 Immigration Act, which
excluded aliens ineligible for citizenship, including East Asians and South Asians).
2 See Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten "Repatriation" of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and
Lessonsfor the "War on Terror", 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 4-13 (2005).
13Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed).
14See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595-96 (1889).
For more thorough discussion of explicit racial discrimination in U.S. immigration history, see
BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 1-8 (2004) (arguing that
anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States are a reaction to Mexican and other nonEuropean immigration); LOPEZ, supra note 11, at 1-2 (describing how "the individuals who
petitioned for naturalization forced the courts into a case-by-case struggle to define who was a
'white person,"' because naturalization was initially restricted to free whites).
1- Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2006).

2011

Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts

United States," 16 or, without any explanation, labeling asylum applicants
"as religious 'zealots' whose exercise of religion was 'offensive to a
majority."' 17 Thankfully, such comments remain the exception rather than
the rule.
The type of explicit prejudice more common today is "modem"
prejudice, which is much more subtle than the old-fashioned kind, due to
changing social norms regarding acceptable beliefs and behaviors.1 8
"According to the theory of modern prejudice, negativity is only expressed
overtly when it can be justified on non-prejudicial grounds, as this allows
for the maintenance of an egalitarian and non-prejudiced self-image." 19
Denying the existence of discrimination is the hallmark of modem
prejudice. 20 Individuals with modem prejudice still espouse discriminatory
beliefs but consider them "empirical facts" rather than forms of prejudice.2
A similar concept to "modem prejudice" is "aversive prejudice." While
the term "modem prejudice" is often used to describe those who are
politically conservative, the corollary of "aversive prejudice" characterizes
"those who are politically liberal and openly endorse non-prejudiced
views, but whose unconscious negative feelings and beliefs get expressed

Sukwanputra
11

v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 638 (3d Cir. 2006).
I, Floroiu v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2007); accord Todorovic v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
621 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that "the IJ relied on impermissible stereotypes
about gay people as a substitute for substantial evidence"); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the IJ's personal conjecture about domestic
violence was indicative of bias and stereotypical assumption).
1' Brochu et al., supra note 9, at 29. Surprisingly, the concepts of "modem," "aversive," and
"implicit" prejudice developed relatively independently, so they have not been wellintegrated. The relationship between modem prejudice and aversive prejudice, in particular,
remains unclear because it "has rarely been the subject of extensive theoretical or empirical
investigations." Bertram Gawronski et al., Understanding the Relations Between Different Forms
of Racial Prejudice: A Cognitive Consistency Perspective,34 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL.
648, 649 (2008) (proposing a theoretical framework for integrating several concepts of
contemporary research on racial prejudice).
1Brochu et al., supra note 9, at 29.
Id. The concept of modem racism includes four related beliefs:
2,.
(1) Discrimination is a thing of the past because blacks now have the
freedom to compete in the marketplace and to enjoy those things they can
afford. (2) Black are pushing too hard, too fast and into places where they
are not wanted. (3) These tactics and demands are unfair. (4) Therefore,
recent gains are undeserved and the prestige granting institutions of
society are giving blacks more attention and the concomitant status than
they deserve.
John B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91, 92-93 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
21Gawronski et al., supra note 18, at 649.
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in subtle, indirect, and often rationalizable ways." 22 These negative feelings
"do not reflect open antipathy, but rather consist of more avoidant
reactions of discomfort, anxiety, or fear." 23 Thus, those with aversive
prejudice have egalitarian explicit (conscious) attitudes but negative
24
implicit (unconscious) attitudes.
A few examples of modem or aversive prejudice in U.S. immigration
law include: the exclusion of all homosexuals from the United States,
ostensibly on health-related grounds, until 1990; 25 the ban preventing all
HIV-positive aliens from traveling or immigrating to the United States
(also ostensibly a public health measure), which was finally lifted in
January 2010;26 and the detention of hundreds of Arabs, Muslims, and
South Asians as suspected "terrorists" under the U.S.A. Patriot Act after
the events of 9/11.27 In each of these cases, the measures targeting a
particular group could be rationalized in a non-prejudicial way.
Even "positive" reforms that appear to reduce discrimination could
have subtle underlying discriminatory motives or implications. For
example, when lawmakers eliminated the overtly discriminatory National
Quota system in 1965 and replaced it with an immigration system based
largely on family relationships, they anticipated that this new system
would largely maintain the racial and ethnic composition of the United
States.28 Similarly, per-country ceilings have disparate racial impacts on

" Pearson et al., supra note 8, at 317. "Support for the aversive racism framework has been
obtained across a broad range of experimental paradigms and participant populations,
including emergency and nonemergency helping behavior inside and outside of the
laboratory, selection decisions in employment and college admission, interpersonal
judgments, and policy and legal decisions." Id. at 318.
-3Id. at 317.
21Id. While the majority of whites in the United States appear non-prejudiced on explicit
measures of prejudice, such as a self-reports, a similar percentage reveal racial biases when
tested with implicit measures, such as the Implicit Association Test ("IAT"). Id.
21 Compare Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 18, 79 Stat. 911, 920 (excluding
immigrants "afflicted with.., sexual deviation"), with Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (formally removing homosexuality from the list of healthbased grounds of exclusion).
2 Medical Examination of Aliens-Removal of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Infection from Definition of Communicable Disease of Public Health Significance, 74 Fed. Reg.
56, 547 (Nov. 2,2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 34).
2
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A
REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH
OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 20-21 (2003), available at http://
www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf.
z8See DAVID REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR: THE THIRD WORLD COMES TO AMERICA 7273 (2d ed. 1992); see also KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 93-106 (2004) (arguing that legal interpretation and actual implementation of
THE INVESTIGATION
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immigration. 29 Race also informs many of the current debates on
immigration in somewhat covert ways. "[Riacialized images are clearly
engaged in distinguishing the deserving from the undeserving," 30 and
Mexicans need not be specifically named in such discussions, as they are
tacitly understood to be the undeserving (and criminal) "illegals." 31 While
immigrants to the United States are more diverse today than ever before,
this diversity is "masked by discourse that racializes immigration
32
legislation as policy concerned only with Mexican immigraion."
In addition to influencing discourse on immigration policy, modem or
aversive prejudice influences administrative immigration adjudications,
albeit in ways that are harder to pin down than old-fashioned prejudice.
Unlike blatant prejudice, which manifests as antipathy and hate, in legal
judgments aversive prejudice involves the use of cognitive rationalizing
processes. 33 Therefore, as aversive racists embrace egalitarian values, they
generally act appropriately in social situations where "discrimination
would be obvious to others and to themselves." 34 However:

immigration laws have involved strong racial bias); EITHNE LUIBHEID, ENTRY DENIED:
CONTROLLING SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER xxi-xxii (2002) (challenging the idea that just because
"explicitly discriminatory provisions based on race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation have
been stricken from immigration law, immigration control is now implemented fairly"); LINA
NEWTON, ILLEGAL, ALIEN, OR IMMIGRANT: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 145 (2008)
("Since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act removed race and nationality as factors for
excluding immigrants, the political focus on legal status has obscured how racial ideologies
still permeate the crafting of immigration policies."); Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles:
The Deep Roots of Modern Nativism, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTIIMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 34-39 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (arguing that
modem immigration policies may be written in a race-neutral manner but still contain
elements of past racist/nativist policies).
See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1993) (arguing for "both geographic and ethnic neutrality" in immigration
selection policies).
"INEWTON, supra note 28, at 145. "The racialized imagery of immigration restriction
assuages: it communicates that the freeloaders, the threats, the people unwilling to conform to
standards and values prized in the polity are being denied entry or access on arrival." Id. at
153.
Id. at 145-46. Newton contends that the criminality associated with crossing the border in
violation of the law "when combined with attributes of laziness, welfare usage, and female
childbearing, forges an image of the Mexican illegal that is race-based." Id. at 145-46. The
absence of images of unauthorized immigrants from other countries further affirms that
illegal aliens are Mexicans.
'2 Id. at 153.
3 Pearson et al., supra note 8, at 318.
34 Id.
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[Their] non-conscious feelings and beliefs. . . will produce
discrimination in situations in which normative structure is
weak, when the guidelines for appropriate behavior are unclear,
when the basis for social judgment is vague, or when one's
actions can be justified or rationalized based on some factor other
35
than race.

The informality of immigration court-where the rules of evidence do not
apply, forty percent of respondents are unrepresented by counsel, and
overloaded, burned out judges are allowed to play an inquisitorial rolecreates a setting with weak normative structures and vague guidelines for
appropriate behavior, leading to discrimination. 36
While the Supreme Court has held that "expressions of impatience,
37
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger" do not amount to bias,
numerous appellate courts have found bias by immigration judges in
precisely these types of situations, suggesting that they sense an
underlying prejudice that undermines the fairness of the proceedings. 38 For
example, federal judges have found bias where the IJ spoke in an
"argumentative, sarcastic, and sometimes arguably insulting manner" 39
engaged in "bullying" until the petitioner was "ground to bits,"40 appeared
"'unseemly,' 'intemperate,' and even 'mocking"' 41 or took on the role of "a
prosecutor anxious to pick holes in the petitioner's story." 42 While one may
be inclined to dismiss such IJs as just "a few bad seeds," their hostile
attitudes reflect an anxiety about immigration and an underlying prejudice
43
toward potential immigrants that is actually quite widespread.

35Id.
See infra Part II.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). The social psychological studies
discussed in this Article regarding modem and implicit forms of prejudice present good
reasons to think critically about Liteky's holding.
-1 The way in which implicit bias affects behavior is "complex and, therefore,. . . difficult to
study." David M. Amodio & Saaid A. Mendoza, Implicit Intergroup Bias: Cognitive,Affective and
Motivational Underpinnings, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLIcrr SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 1, at 353,
361 ("More research is needed to determine the situations in which implicit bias may be
expressed as discomfort versus hostility.").
3"Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2007).
11Chain v. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006).
41 Castilho de Oliveira v. Holder, 564 F.3d 892, 900 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2007)) (recalling "similar behavior
by [Immigration] Judge Brathos in other cases").
42Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d
959, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (Noonan J., dissenting)).
"

4-Cf. Margot K. Mendelson, Note, Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S. Immigration
Courts, 119 YALE L.J. 1012, 1015 (2010) (arguing that "immigration courts function as a forum
for the production and performance of American identity narratives").

2011

Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts

In the vigorous debates about comprehensive immigration reform, we
do not hear many expressions of old-fashioned prejudice, but some of the
deepest concerns regarding a legalization program that would potentially
grant "amnesty" to millions of undocumented people reflect forms of
modem or aversive prejudice.44 Indeed, the fear of "opening the
floodgates" and allowing millions of people, mostly Latinos, to immigrate
to the United States echoes the fear noted by the Supreme Court in Chae
Chan Ping regarding the "great danger that at no distant day [ai portion of
our country would be overrun by [Chinese]." 45 While economics is
certainly a relevant factor in formulating immigration policy, subtle forms
of prejudice often underlie public responses to economic arguments. A
recent study shows that "news about the cost of immigration boosts white
opposition far more when Latino immigrants, rather than European
immigrants, are featured." 46 Thus, the level of support for immigration
depends on the racial identity of the prospective immigrants. 47 The study
further found that race influences opinions about immigration because
racial or ethnic cues trigger intense emotional reactions, especially anxiety

11NEWTON, supranote 28, at 2 ("The desire to avoid appearing anti-immigrant and, perhaps
inadvertently, appearing racist, reflects the constraints lawmakers feel when embarking on
immigration reform in a post-Civil Rights era."). Newton identifies various themes that
emerge in congressional discussions around immigration reform, such as keeping out "the
unauthorized, the invaders-the bad kinds of immigrants" and contrasting them with the
"good immigrants who 'founded this nation,"' which "privileg[es] . . . the European
immigrant experience." Id.; see also LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING
IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, AND THE NATION 6 (2008) ("Debates over immigration reform provide
ample opportunities for the Latino Threat Narrative to become invoked. In addition,
immigration reform legislation is an exercise in inclusion and exclusion when it comes to
defining who is legitimately able to join the community of citizens."). Signs of aversive
prejudice also appeared during the 1980s in discussions of the legalization program that was
passed under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"). See HING, supranote
14, at 182 ("The ambivalence over amnesty reflected the policy makers' desire to keep out
undocumented Mexicans and not demonstrate any sign of approval for those already here.");
JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE WAR ON "ILLEGALS" AND THE
REMAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BOUNDARY 104 (2010) ("The perceived failure of IRCA to

address the issue of unauthorized boundary crossing from Mexico sufficiently helped to fuel a
resurgence of anti-immigration sentiment (again, with a focus on 'illegal' immigration).").
Nevins describes the construction of the U.S.-Mexico boundary "as a physical divide ...
intermixed with the making of the associated.., social boundaries that help to define and
make distinctions between 'us' and 'them'-social categories heavily imbued with hierarchical
concepts and practices vis-h-vis race, class, gender, nation, and geographical origins." Id. at
193.
45Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
46Ted Brader et al., What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and
Immigration Threat, 52 AM. J. POL. SCi. 959, 959 (2008).
47Id.
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related to perceived threats, which in turn trigger changes in opinion that
are independent of changes in beliefs about the severity of immigration
problems. 48 These results confirm the importance of understanding the role
of prejudice, whether subtle or overt, in immigration adjudication.
II. Implicit Bias in Administrative Immigration Adjudications
In today's society, many individuals may hesitate to express even
modem forms of prejudice, much less old-fashioned prejudice. 49 While
most research on modem and old-fashioned prejudice assessed attitudes
using traditional explicit measures, such as self-reports, "[t]he past two
decades have seen the development of a new, alternative approach to
attitude assessment," using implicit measures.50 These implicit measures
not only avoid unwanted influences that muddy explicit measures, like
"the desire to appear socially appropriate," but also "reveal unique
components of attitudes that lie outside conscious awareness and
control."51
Consequently, implicit attitudes may diverge from self-reports in
revealing ways. For example, a study found that although participants
reported that whites and African Americans both have strong ties to
American culture, measures of their implicit attitudes revealed that they
associated whites more than African Americans, with the concept of
"American." 52 Numerous studies show only weak correlations between
explicit and implicit bias toward certain social groups, as these are
"qualitatively different types of attitudes that are each subject to numerous
influences-some shared and some unique." 53 A recent meta-analysis of
122 research studies, involving a total of 14,900 subjects, showed that in the
domains of stereotyping and prejudice, implicit bias Implicit Association
Test ("IAT") scores actually predict behavior better than explicit selfreports.5 4 At least one study has specifically confirmed the link between

IFId.
4'John E. Edlund & Jeremy D. Heider, The Relationship Between Modern and Implicit Prejudice,
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN PREJUDICE, supranote 9,at 77, 79.
$0Id.

51Id. (citing Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measures, in THE NATURE OF
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 117-150 (Henry L. Roediger III

et al. eds., 2001)).
52See Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 447,447 (2005).
3 Edlund & Heider, supranote 49,at 81.
54Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III.
Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (2009).
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implicit bias and behavior (i.e. judgments) among trial judges.55 Moreover,
"evidence is growing that explicit decisions can indeed be shaped by
automatic biases."56 Such evidence underscores the importance of taking
implicit bias seriously when analyzing how prejudice influences the way
that judges make decisions.
The two primary techniques used to measure implicit bias are
evaluative priming and IAT.57 In an evaluative priming procedure,
participants are briefly exposed to a subliminal or supraliminal prime (e.g.
photographs of African American or Caucasian faces), and then asked to
make decisions about whether certain words are negative or positive.5 8 The
"response times on the task (i.e., faster responses to negative words after a
black prime) can be used as a measure of implicit bias."5 9 The second
technique involves the IAT, a computer-based test that requires users to
categorize rapidly the pairings of concepts, such as "white" and "black,"
with either positive or negative attributes, such as "hardworking" or
"lazy." 60 Stronger, easier mental associations between the concept and the
attribute lead to faster response times, while weaker, more difficult
associations lead to slower response times.61 Thus, if it takes longer for a
user to categorize the pairing of "black" with "hardworking" than "white"
with "hardworking," the slower response time signals the presence of
implicit bias against blacks.62 By measuring response times and error rates
related to such pairings, the IAT measures implicit attitudes.
Studies using the IAT have replicated the existence of implicit attitudes
towards many marginalized groups, including, but not limited to, racial

5- See, e.g., Jeffrey J.Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1222 (2009) (showing, through a study involving 133 trial judges,
that implicit biases can influence judicial decisionmaking but that such biases can also be
overcome). For evidence of the link between implicit bias and behavior in the medical context,
see Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisionsfor Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231, 1235 (2007) (finding
that physicians with higher IAT scores were more likely to offer appropriate treatment to
white patients than to black patients diagnosed with the same condition but that doctors who
were aware of the purpose of the study, and therefore sensitive to the risk of exhibiting biased
behavior, could compensate for their implicit biases).
51Galen V. Bodenhausen & Andrew R. Todd, Automatic Aspects of Judgment and Decision
Making, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION, supranote 1, at 278, 281.
57Edlund & Heider, supra note 49, at 79-80. For an explanation of IAT, see infra text
accompanying notes 61-62.
5, Edlund & Heider, supranote 49, at 79.
STUART OSKAMP & P. WESLEY SCHULTZ, ATrnUDES AND OPINIONS 396 (3d ed. 2005).
0 See Edlund & Heider, supra note 49, at 80.

61See id.
12See id.
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and ethnic minorities, Muslims, women, and homosexuals. 63 Since such
marginalized groups routinely appear before immigration judges,
especially in asylum cases, it is surprising that the role of implicit bias in
immigration court has not yet been scrutinized. The following sections
outline some of the factors that likely contribute to implicit bias by
immigration judges and the BIA, providing a basic framework for further
exploration.
A. Factors That Contribute to Implicit Bias in Immigration Court
There are several reasons why implicit bias is especially likely to
influence decisionmaking in the immigration context. The following
sections discuss various relevant factors providing a general overview.
1.

Lack of Independence and InquisitorialAdjudication

Judges tend to display the same types of implicit bias found in the
general American population, despite their professional commitment to
fairness and objectivity. 64 Their implicit bias, however, does not necessarily
impact their judgments. 65 When judges are highly motivated to avoid
making biased judgments, they can compensate for their implicit biases in
their decisionmaking, adhering more closely to the norm of impartiality set
forth in the Judicial Code of Conduct. 66 Among all judges, however, IJs

6 See, e.g., Bethany Albertson, Religious Appeals and Implicit Attitudes, 32 POL. PSYCHOL. 109
(2010) (testing a theory that Christian religious appeals made by politicians would impact the
implicit attitudes of people who identify as Christian); Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit Bias
in Impression Formation:Associations Influence the Construal of Individuating Information, 33 EUR.
J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 573 (2003) (studying implicit biases toward German and Turkish
individuals); William A. Jellison et al., Implicit and Explicit Measures of Sexual Orientation
Attitudes: Ingroup Preferences and Related Behaviors and Beliefs Among Gay and Straight Men, 30
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 629 (2004) (researching implicit attitudes of related to
sexual preferences); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007) (using a web-based format to study implicit
bias related to numerous marginalized groups); Monique L. Lyle, Dueling Consciousness:
Elite Influence on Explicit & Implicit Endorsement of Racial Hierarchy (2008) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Duke University) (on file with Department of Political Science, Duke
University) (studying implicit bias toward racial minorities).
64 See Rachlinski et al, supra note 55, at 1221-22 ("The proportion of white judges in our
study who revealed automatic associations of white with good and black with bad was, if
anything, slightly higher than the proportion found in the online surveys of white
Americans."). The study also notes that "[wlhite capital defense attorneys, another group
which might be expected to have strong professional commitments to the norm of racial
equality, exhibit the same automatic preference for whites as the general population." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
6sId.
66

at 1222-23; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucT CANON 2 (2007) ("A judge shall
Id.
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have the weakest structural and professional norms to remain impartial
and independent. Unlike federal judges who derive their authority from
Article III of the Constitution and have the highest degree of independence
through lifetime appointments, IJs are career civil servants within the
Department of Justice. 67 They have even less independence than
Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"), who derive their power through
of judicial
congressional legislation and have a substantial degree
68
independence under the Administrative Procedure Act.
IJs' role as attorneys in the Department of Justice lies at the heart of the
69
critique that they lack true independence. They belong to the same agency
that represents the government in removal cases before the federal courts
of appeal.70 Moreover, the majority of IJs previously worked in positions
that were adversarial to immigrants, primarily as trial attorneys in the
Department of Homeland Security. 7 One study found that IJs who
previously worked in positions adversarial to immigrants were
significantly less likely to grant asylum than IJs who had not held such
positions and that the grant rates dropped even lower for IJs who had held
adversarial positions for over a decade. 72 The controversy over political
appointments and reassignments of IJs by the Attorney General casts an
73
even darker shadow over their independence as adjudicators.

perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.").
17 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006) (stating that an immigration judge is "an attorney whom the
Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office for
Immigration Review.").
11 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006) (requiring the
separation of adjudicatory personnel from investigative and enforcement personnel and
prohibiting ALJs from privately consulting anyone on any "fact in issue" in the proceeding); §
557(d)(1) (prohibiting ex parte communications); 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006) (providing that
ALJs can be suspended or removed only for good cause and after a hearing); see also Elizabeth
Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L. J. 1032, 1068 (2011)
("ALJs.. .are fairly independent of the agencies in which they sit.).
f.9
See, e.g., Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 467, 471 (2007); Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There From Here: Managing
Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 415; Stephen H. Legomsky,
Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 379 (2006) [hereinafter
Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence]; Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1667-75 (2009) [hereinafter Legomsky,
RestructuringImmigrationAdjudication].
See Benson, supranote 69, at 415, 422.
71See Benedetto, supra note 69, at 472 (referring to the former office of immigration review

as Immigration and Naturalization Service).
12 Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 295, 345-46 (2007).
1 See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 69, at 379, 389.
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IJs' lack of genuine independence becomes even more troubling in
light of their inquisitorial role. The Immigration and Nationality Act allows
IJs to interrogate, examine, and cross-examine witnesses. 74 Given that
roughly 57-65% of respondents in immigration proceedings have been
unrepresented during the past five years,7 5 the inquisitorial role of IJs can
contribute to the appearance of a one-party system and make it even easier
for IJs to abuse their authority. These concerns about the neutrality of IJs
are particularly striking when one considers that respondents in removal
proceedings do not have any of the protections against bias that
characterize criminal trials, such as voir dire and peremptory strikes,
although deportation is akin to criminal punishment in its severity. 76 The
lack of genuine independence of IJs, coupled with their inquisitorial role,
creates a situation where "the guidelines for appropriate behavior are
unclear," which allows implicit bias to go unchecked and contributes to
discrimination in deciding cases.The absence of structural and professional norms to encourage
independence among IJs makes it easier for implicit bias to influence their
behavior. 78 Moving EOIR outside the Department of Justice would help
ensure a greater separation between adjudication and enforcement, while
adopting a judicial code of conduct and annual performance evaluations
(by someone outside the Department of Justice) represent basic first steps
to promote impartiality and protect against biased decisionmaking. 79

According to a 2008 report by the Department of Justice Inspector General and Office of
Professional Responsibility, the Bush Administration engaged in a systemic campaign to pack
the Immigration Courts with "good Republicans" who were "completely on the team,"
appointing as IJs only individuals who had been "screened for their political or ideological
affiliations." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING
BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 110-11,

116 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf. While it is possible
that specialization itself may politicize the bench, such explicit political appointments to the
immigration courts clearly compromises their independence, especially since those lJs remain
on the bench today. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1227, 1230-31 (finding a correlation between bankruptcy judges' political views and the
outcome of some of their cases, suggesting that "one potential downside of specialization" is
that it "might politicize the bench").
7 8 U.S.C. § 1129a(b)(1) (2006).

See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK, at G1 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyl0syb.pdf.
'

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
Pearson et al., supra note 8, at 318.

, Cf. Rachlinski et al, supra note 55, at 1222-23.
79 See Lindsey R. Vaala, Note, Bias on the Bench: Raising the Barfor U.S. Immigration Judges to
Ensure Equalityfor Asylum Seekers, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1039-40 (2007) (advocating for
vigorous enforcement of the Code of Conduct, if one is adopted).
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2.

Limited Opportunity to Engage in Deliberate Thinking

In situations where an individual's implicit and explicit attitudes differ,
the implicit attitude serves as the "default," and the explicit attitude "only
overrides the implicit attitude if the individual has the cognitive capacity
available to do so." 80 The conditions under which immigration judges
currently operate reduce their cognitive capacity, making it more likely
that implicit biases will drive their decisions. Specifically, their
extraordinarily high caseload means that they have little time to think
before issuing oral decisions into a tape recorder, and they are often
overwhelmed and exhausted. Studies have shown that stereotypes have a
81
stronger impact on judgments when they are made under time pressure.
Indeed, "systematic changes of cognitive process" occur when people
make decisions under time pressure.82 We tend to consider fewer kinds of
information, use the information in a more shallow way, give more weight
to negative information, and make more variable, less accurate
judgments. 83 Moreover, "when people are tired, distracted, or rushed, they

U Kipling D. Williams & Cassandra L. Govan, Reacting to Ostracism: Retaliation or
Reconciliation?, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 47, 56 (Dominic
Abrams et al. eds., 2005) (citing Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107
PSYCHOL. REV. 101 (2000)).
6 See, e.g., Randall A. Gordon & Kris S. Anderson, Perceptions of Race-Stereotypic and RaceNonstereotypicCrimes: The Impact of Response-Time Instructions on Attributions and Judgments, 16
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 455 (1995) (showing that the race-to-crime stereotype
matching effects on punishment and severity indicators emerged only when decisions were
made quickly); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (2001) (finding
greater stereotype bias in weapon misidentifications when participants responded under time
pressure than when they responded at their own pace); Ad van Knippenberg et al., Judgement
and Memory of a Criminal Act: The Effects of Stereotypes and Cognitive Load, 29 EUR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 191 (1999) (showing a more general effect of negative stereotypes on legal case
decisions only when participants were under time pressure); cf. Roger Giner-Sorolla et al.,
Validity Beliefs and Ideology Can Influence Legal Case Judgments Differently, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 507 (2002) (measuring the impact of validity beliefs and feminist ideology in
simulated individual juror decisions in a sex-discrimination case, and finding "validity beliefs
had a direct, heuristic impact on judgment only under time pressure," while ideology had a
more pervasive influence on the decisionmaking process).
82 Anne Edland & Ola Svenson, Judgment and Decision Making Under Time Pressure: Studies
and Findings, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 27,
37 (Ola Svenson & A. John Maule eds., 1993); see also Dan Zakay, The Impact of Time Perception
Processes on Decision Making under Time Stress, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra, at 59, 67 ("[D]ecision making under time stress is
actually decision making with limited resources. The noxious impact of limited resources on
cognitive performance in various domains is well documented ... .
8- Edland & Svenson, supra note 82, at 28-29, 36.
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are more likely to respond based on automatic impulses than when they
are energetic, focused, and unhurried." 84 The evidence below shows that IJs
are operating under atrocious circumstances for conscious, deliberative
decisionmaking.
First, UJs have an enormous caseload, handling an average of 1300
removal cases per year, which far exceeds the volume of cases heard by
other types of judges. 85 This actually represents a significant improvement
over recent years. According to the Government Accountability Office, the
number of immigration judges increased by only 3% while the courts'
caseload increased by 39% during the years 2000 to 2005.86 The average
number of cases per IJ increased from 1852 in 2000 to 2505 in 2005, and the
number of completed cases increased by 37% during that period.8 7 In some
locations, the caseload per judge was much higher. 88 Immigration courts
nationwide responded to the increasing caseload by setting a series of
deadlines for completing cases. 89 Starting in fiscal year 2003, the courts
aimed to complete all cases older than three years by December 31, 2005. 90
EOIR has also established target timeframes for various types of cases. 91
Since EOIR and the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge ("OCIJ")
evaluate the performance of immigration courts based in part on their
success in meeting such case completion goals, the emphasis often remains
on quantity rather than quality of decisions.92 While some recent reforms
do aim to improve quality, 93 IJs remain under intense pressure to make

81Payne & Gawronski, supra note 1, at 10 (citing Russel H. Fazio & Tamara Towles-Schwen,
The MODE Model of Attitude-Behavior Processes, in DUAL-PROCEss THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 97-116 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); accord Fritz Strack & Roland
Deutsch, Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior, 8 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. REV. 220 (2004)).

15See Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 69, at 1651-52
(articulating that 214 IJshandle roughly 280,000 removal proceedings per year).
F6U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 13 (2006) [hereinafter

GAO REPORT], available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1067.pdf. The number of
immigration judges increased from 206 in 2000 to 212 in 2005. Id.
8Id. at 4.
ssFor example, the immigration courts in Harlington and San Antonio, Texas each had an
average of over 8000 cases per judge in 2005. Id. at 13.
'

Id. at 14.

'J

Id. at 4, 14-15. The courts did not meet their ambitious case completion goals. Id. at 15.
See id. at 21 tbl.3. For example, the target timeframe for an expedited defensive asylum

case is 180 days, while the target timeframe for non-detained individuals with other types of
applications for relief is 240 days. Id.
!12See GAO REPORT, supranote 86, at 20-22.
" "In January 2006, the Attorney General requested a comprehensive review of the
immigration courts, to include the quality of work ...." Id. at 29. In August 2006, after
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decisions quickly.94
Even in complex asylum cases, where testimony can take many hours
and is often presented over several hearing dates, spaced months or years
apart, IJs generally do not have time to review and analyze the evidence as
a whole before rendering a decision.9 According to another report by the
U.S. Government Accountability Office, "[elighty-two percent of [IJs
surveyed] reported time limitations as 'moderately or very challenging'
aspects of asylum adjudications and 77 percent [described] managing their
caseload [as] 'moderately or very challenging.' ' 96 To make matters worse,
IJs generally give their decision orally as soon as the testimony is
completed. 97 The use of oral decisions in such complex cases itself
interferes with a deliberate, individualized, and analytically sophisticated
approach, encouraging instead the use of generic and formulaic responses
to factually and legally complex claims. 98
In addition, IJs have very limited support staff, sharing one law clerk
for every four judges and lacking adequate administrative support.99 The
lack of support staff means that IJs often do not have time to conduct
thorough legal research or stay abreast of rapidly evolving case law.
Moreover, since most respondents are unrepresented, IJs usually do not
have the benefit of legal briefs in analyzing challenging or novel questions
of law. All of these factors present structural impediments to deliberate
and thoughtful decisionmaking.
A 2007 survey of stress and burnout among IJs confirms that they feel
deprived of the opportunity to think deliberately about the difficult issues
before them.10 The web-based survey conducted by Stuart Lustig, M.D.,

completion of the review, the Attorney General implemented a number of reforms, including
performance evaluations for immigration judges. Id.
94 See Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 69, at 1654-56.
' See id. at 1653 (citing Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before S. Comm on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 184 (2006) (statement of John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit)).
"

UNITED STATES GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-935, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:

AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS TO HELP ENSURE QUALITY IN THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
PROCESS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 8 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON U.S. ASYLUM
SYSTEM], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08935.pdf.

' See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges' Chambers: NarrativeResponses from the National
Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 57, 79 (2008).
91 See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 37 (2007) ("[Tlhe discipline of opinion writing might enable well-meaning judges to
overcome their intuitive, impressionistic reactions. The process of writing might challenge the
judge to assess a decision more carefully, logically, and deductively."(footnotes omitted)).
See Legomsky, RestructuringImmigration Adjudication, supranote 69, at 1652.
l Lustig et al., supranote 97, at 64-65.
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M.P.H., and his colleagues used two measures, the Secondary Traumatic
Stress Scale ("STSS") and the Copenhagen Burnout Inventory ("CBI"), to
assess levels of stress and burnout among IJs.101 The most commonly
reported issue pertained to "the amount of work and the paucity of time in
which to complete it."102 Typical responses from IJs stressed the lack of
time for deliberation before reaching a decision, confirming such factors as
the pressure to complete cases, the extemporaneous nature of oral
decisions, and denial of access to transcripts that would allow them to
review testimony before making a decision. 1°3 As one IJ aptly stated,
"[tjhere is not enough time to think."1 4 Under such circumstances, one cannot
expect explicit attitudes to override implicit ones. 105 Implicit attitudes
surface when individuals are under time pressure and a heavy cognitive
load-conditions that clearly apply to IJs. 10 6 Reducing IJs' caseload and
giving them more time to assess each case is therefore critical to creating
opportunities for them to control implicit bias through "active, conscious
07
control."1

'o
'2
'0'

Id. at 59.
Id. at 64.
For example, Ils made the following statements:
"In those cases where I would like more time to consider all the facts and weigh
what I have heard I rarely have much time to do so simply because of the
pressure to complete cases." Id.
" We are told to keep producing-to get the cases done, without regard to the fact
that we have insufficient support staff, insufficient time to deliberate and to
complete cases, and outdated equipment." Id.

S

"The cases require judges ... to rule promptly at the end of the hearing in the
form of a lengthy, detailed and extemporaneous oral decision with little or no
time to reflect or to deliberate." Id. at 65.
"We are denied transcripts and must decide complex cases, yet we are expected
to render oral decisions on the spot." Id.
I feel demeaned by being unable to control my own work life as a professional,
to be prevented from making the crucial judgment calls on how to decide a caseon the spot or after calm deliberation and research." Id. at 72.

04

Id. at 66 (emphasis added).

See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
See Williams & Govan, supra note 80, at 56 (citing Wilson et al., supranote 80).
107 Rachlinski et al., supra note 55, at 1225 ("Judges who, due to time pressure or other

'.

'"

distractions, do not actively engage in an effort to control the 'bigot in the brain' are apt to
behave just as the judges in our study in which we subliminally primed with race-related
words").
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3.

Low Motivation Resulting From High Levels of Stress and
Burnout

Low motivation, regardless of the cause, affects the manner in which
we make decisions. "When individuals are depleted or under cognitive
load, they are likely to set a lower criterion for decision validity; as a result,
they may be satisfied with a decision that is largely based on the
implications of their automatic reactions rather than more extensive
deliberation."10 8 Conversely, "[i]f they are internally driven or otherwise
motivated to suppress their own biases, people can make judgments free
from biases, even implicit ones." 10 9
The aforementioned survey of stress and burnout among IJs revealed
common feelings of low self-esteem and demoralization (sometimes in
response to scathing criticism by appellate judges and the public), as well
as widespread psychological issues, such as depression and excessive
stress.110 Roughly half of the judges who responded to the survey reported
challenges to esteem, including lack of respect and understanding,
criticism, and intense scrutiny by appellate court judges."' On the one
hand, fear of criticism and judicial scrutiny may help reduce prejudice if it
pushes IJs to issue more careful and thoughtful decisions. Studies show
that when fear of invalidity is high, judgments are likely to reflect a wider
range of considerations than just strong attitudinal associations.1 2 On the
other hand, if the challenges to esteem are so great that Js feel personally
threatened, as some clearly do," 3 then the judges are likely to show higher
I",'Bodenhausen & Todd, supra note 56, at 285-86; see also Mario B. Ferreira et al., Automatic
and Controlled Components of Judgment and Decision Making, 91 J. PERsoNALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
797, 806 (2006) (showing that decisions made under a load were more likely to be made based
on a salient simple heuristic, since cognitive load interfered with propositional reasoning but
not automatic reasoning).
109 Rachlinski et al., supra note 55, at 1202 (footnotes ommitted); see also Jack Glaser & Eric D.
Knowles, Implicit Motivation to ControlPrejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 170-71
(2008) (finding that individuals who are highly motivated to control prejudice can avoid the
"shooter bias," which describes how white targets are more likely to shoot a black target
pulling something out of his pocket); Green et al., supra note 55 (finding "that implicit bias can
be recognized and modulated to counteract its effect on treatment decisions [by physicians]").
110See Lustig et al., supra note 97, at 71-72.
Of Id.
1 Robert A. Schuette & Russel H. Fazio, Attitude Accessibility and Motivation As
Determinants of Biased Processing: A Test of the MODE Model, 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 704, 708-10 (1995).
112See Lustig et al., supra note 97, at 71. For example, one IJ stated, "I am demoralized by
being made the 'whipping boy' by the press and public, when it is the system we are forced to
follow that contributes so greatly to errors I may make." Id. Another IJ noted, "[olur last
annual meeting spent far too much time telling us how awful we were." Id. Yet another
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levels of implicit prejudice.11 4 Studies also indicate that individuals who
feel ostracized, rejected, and excluded-like the IJs who see themselves as
targets of circuit court criticism -show more implicit prejudice.115
Moreover, low motivation, especially when coupled with a limited
opportunity to engage in deliberate thinking, often corresponds to higher
levels of implicit bias." 6 Lustig's survey of IJs reveals shockingly high
levels of burnout and low motivation. Overall, the responses received from
fifty-nine IJs demonstrated "significant symptoms of secondary traumatic
stress."" 7 Many IJs "reported that the work was emotionally draining,"" 8
often leading to dissatisfaction with their jobs. 19 The study linked
challenges to self-esteem to higher burnout scores. 20 Burnout "includes a
decreased sense of personal and/or professional accomplishment,

reported feeling "intimidated and humiliated by the federal courts." Id.
1 Studies show higher levels of implicit bias under conditions of personal threat. See
Bertram Gawronski & Rajees Sritharan, Formation, Change, and Contextualization of Mental
Associations: Determinants and Principles of Variations in Implicit Measures, in HANDBOOK OF
IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 1, at 216, 231; Cynthia M. Frantz et al., A Threat in the
Computer: The Race Implicit Association Test as a Stereotype Threat Experience, 30 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1611 (2004) (obtaining higher scores of implicit bias when the task
purported to measure racism as opposed to cultural stereotypes); Laurie A. Rudman et al.,
Implicit Self-Esteem Compensation: Automatic Threat Defense, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
798, 798-813 (2007) (finding higher levels of implicit prejudice under conditions of personal
threat).
In one study, researchers examined ostracism and included individuals' implicit and
explicit attitudes towards Aboriginal and White Australians. While ostracized individuals
"were equally prosocial in their responses to the explicit measures (old fashioned and modem
prejudice), . . . there was a significant difference in the IAT results, suggesting that ostracised
participants were showing more implicit prejudice towards Aboriginals than included
participants." Williams & Govan, supranote 80, at 58.
11Vincent Yzerbyt & Stephanie Demoulin, Intergroup Relations, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1024, 1110 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010) ("Individuals with the
combination of high internal motivation and low external motivation to control prejudice,
presumably because their motivations are both highly internalized and autonomous, exhibit
generally low levels of implicit bias."); Bodenhausen & Todd, supra note 56, at 284 ("Some
dual-process models incorporate the idea that automatic reactions are likely to bias
subsequent cognitive elaboration and deliberation, particularly when there is limited
motivation for accuracy or objectivity."); see also John F. Dovidio et al., The Nature of
Contemporary Racial Prejudice: Insight from Implicit and Explicit Measures of Attitudes, in
ATITUDES: INSIGHTS FROM THE NEW LMPLICrF MEASURES 165, 179-180 (Richard E. Petty et al.
eds., 2009) (reviewing the literature on how people's motivation and resources for controlling
bias can moderate the relation between implicit and explicit discrimination).
I" See Lustig et al., supra note 97, at 57.
11 Id. at 74 (emphasis omitted).
I"
d. at 75.
12,Id. at 79.
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emotional exhaustion, and depersonalization (e.g. distancing oneself from
the job, cynicism and loss of compassion) all of which can potentially affect
the outcome for applicants whose fates rest in judges' hands."1 21 Indeed,
"[jiudges reported more burnout than any other group of professionals to
whom the CBI had been administered, including prison wardens and
physicians in busy hospitals." 122 As further evidence of low motivation, "IJs
12
appear to retire from service at the earliest possible date."
This evidence of high burnout and low motivation adds to the
likelihood that implicit attitudes, rather than explicit ones, will drive
decisionmaking among IJs. The culture of apathy in immigration court is
incompatible with a strong motivation to be egalitarian, which helps
control automatic biases.124 Burnout conflicts with creativity, a trait that
reduces the activation of stereotypes, 25 while the struggle to maintain selfesteem can enhance the activation of stereotypes. 26 The combination of
these factors, therefore, makes IJs highly susceptible to basing decisions on
implicit bias.
4.

Legally and Factually Complex Natureof Cases

The nature of the cases that IJs adjudicate also increases the likelihood
that implicit attitudes will influence their decisions. To begin with, removal
and asylum proceedings involve highly complex legal rules that are
constantly evolving.1 27 The factual inquiries in such cases also tend to be
quite complicated. x2 Where the complexity of decisionmaking increases,
people tend to rely more on intuitive cognitive shortcuts (known as
"heuristics"), adopting strategies that are "likely to ease processing of

Id. at 59.
12.
1'Id. at 60.
1-1Lustig et al., supranote 97, at 80.
124
Pearson et al., supra note 8, at 328-29.
Id. at 329 (explaining that creativity "conflicts with the energy-saving and simplifying
1'features of stereotyping").

Id.
126
127See, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 140 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe legal
rules surrounding deportation and asylum proceedings are very complex."); Escobar-Grijalva
v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing immigration laws as "a labyrinth almost
as impenetrable as the Internal Revenue Code"); Reyes-Palacios v. INS, 836 F.2d 1154, 1155
(9th Cir. 1988) ("The importance of counsel, particularly in asylum cases where the law is
complex and developing, can neither be overemphasized nor ignored.").
12" See, e.g., Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the court has "on
several occasions remanded cases in which the agency denied an application for asylum based
on its failure to properly engage in the 'complex and contextual factual inquiry' that such
claims often require" (quoting Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 548 (2d Cir. 2005))).
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complex information." 2 9 While these shortcuts are often useful, they can
also lead to "severe and systematic errors."' 3° Even judges make these
errors. 131 In fact, "[riesearchers have consistently found that intuitive
judgment and decisionmaking is inferior to formal methods." 132 Not only
does reliance on intuitive judgments lead to considering irrelevant
information and underemphasizing important information, but "the
quality of judgments and decisions decrease as task complexity
increases."133

Implicit attitudes especially influence one of the most challenging
aspects of asylum cases: credibility assessments. Determining the
credibility of an asylum applicant is a critical but notoriously difficult
task."" Credibility assessments include evaluations of nonverbal cues, such
as demeanor, which often occur implicitly.135 For example, studies show
1'2 Dan Milech & Melissa Finucane, Decision Support and Behavioral Decision Theory, in
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT MENTAL PROCESSES 291, 293 (Kim Kirsner et al. eds., 1998).
130

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in

JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
2001).
131 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001)
("[U]nder certain circumstances judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically
erroneous judgments").
2 Milech & Finucane, supranote 129, at 293.
133Id.
1 See Solomon v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The courts of appeals
have frequently noted the inherent problems with credibility determinations in asylum
cases."). In Solomon, the Tenth Circuit explained:

Asylum applicants rarely speak English, and their testimony is plagued
with the uncertainties of translation and cultural misunderstanding. They
are generally unfamiliar with American procedures and wary of lawyers
and officials; often they are not well served even by their own legal
counsel. Their escape from persecution sometimes entailed acts of deceit
and prevarication, or even bribery or forgery, which complicates
evaluation of their veracity in immigration proceedings. Moreover,
because of their troubled relations with their native countries, purported
refugees often have difficulty in obtaining documentation to back up their
claims.

Id.; see also Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective CredibilityAssessment in
Refugee Status Determinations, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 367-68 (2003) (discussing how
credibility assessments are "frequently based on personal judgment that is inconsistent from
one adjudicator to the next" and proposing a framework for analyzing testimony "to give
credibility findings a more reliable, reviewable, and objective basis").
1K, Under the REAL ID Act, an IJ may base a credibility determination on the applicant's
demeanor, candor, responsiveness, the inherent plausibility of the story, the consistency of the
applicant's statements, and any inaccuracies in those statements. See REAL ID Act of 2005 §
101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
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that implicit attitudes lead individuals to read unfriendliness or hostility
into the facial expressions of blacks but not whites. 38 Moreover, studies
indicate that implicit bias leads to more negative evaluations of ambiguous
actions by racial and ethnic minorities. 137 One experiment found that
implicit attitudes toward Turks led subjects to rate their behavior more
negatively than that of Germans when these groups were portrayed in
ambiguous situations. 38 Even the complete absence of details, rather than
ambiguous ones, contributes to negative implicit attitudes. A study found
that when details are absent, people simply rely on negative stereotypes to
fill in the gaps. 139 Such studies clearly raise concerns about how IJs respond
to ambiguous actions in evaluating credibility. The huge disparities among
IJs in grant rates for asylum cases, which often turn on credibility, may
4
result at least in part from different levels of implicit bias.1 0
The fear of fraud in asylum cases can also lead an IJ to overestimate its
prevalence and skew his judgment of credibility of a certain claim. The
availability heuristic describes how we estimate the frequency of an event
based on how easily we can recall instances of that event occurring in the
past.' 4' Thus, if an IJ has observed fraud in a number of asylum cases from
a particular country, the availability heuristic may lead him or her to
believe that fraud is more rampant than it really is, which may then
influence assessments of both credibility and the likelihood of future harm
in specific cases. Over 80% of IJs surveyed report that fraud and credibility
assessments are "moderately or very challenging" aspects of adjudicating
asylum cases. 42 These concerns about fraud are not unfounded, as various
reports confirm serious issues with fraud in asylum cases, which have
caused the United States and other receiving countries to take dramatic
actions, such as criminal prosecutions and suspensions of certain benefits

111Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the
Perceptionof Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 64042 (2003).
13 See Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to

Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133, 139-47 (2002).
1" Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit Bias in Impression Formation:Associations Influence the
Construal of Individuating Information, 33 EuR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 573, 581 (2003); cf. Glaser &
Knowles, supra note 109, at 168-69 (finding that most white adults are more likely to "shoot" a

black target who pulls an object out of his pocket, even if the object is his wallet).
[,' Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television
News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 564 (2000).
'I For evidence of such disparities, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette:
Disparitiesin Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 325-49 (2007).
141Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 130, at 11 ("Availability is a useful clue for assessing
frequency or probability, because instances of large classes are usually reached better and

faster than instances of less frequent classes.").
142GAO REPORT ON U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 8.
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for those found guilty of fraud. 143 At the same time, however, such fears of
fraud may contribute to both explicit and implicit bias by leading IJs to
doubt that certain groups actually face any discrimination, a belief that
would validate negative affective reactions toward members of those
1
groups and provide the basis for negative evaluative judgments. "
Rejecting the proposition that a particular group is disadvantaged
represents one way that people, including Js, "can still base their
judgments on their negative affective reactions even when they have strong
egalitarian-related, non-prejudicial goals," thereby maintaining "cognitive
consistency" in their belief systems and avoiding uncomfortable feelings of
"cognitive dissonance." 45 In this way, the prevalence of fraud may itself be
a factor that contributes to bias in immigration court.
5.

Limited Review by the BIA and Federal Courts of Appeal

Finally, Js are especially susceptible to the influence of implicit biases
because administrative and judicial review is so limited in immigration
cases. In 2010, only 8% of respondents appealed decisions by immigration
judges to the BIA,146 and about 25% of BIA decisions were appealed to the
federal court, 147 which means that the chance of an IJ's decision being

14,1See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Joint Task Force Created in 10 Cities
to Combat Document and Benefit Fraud (Apr. 5, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov
/xnews/releases/press -release_0884.shtm (describing fraud as a "serious risk" and noting 992
fraud convictions); Michael Brennan, Two-Thirds of Refugees Claiming to Be Somalian Are Lying,
INDEPENDENT (Dublin) (May 4, 2010), http://www.independent.ie/national-news/twothirds-ofrefugees-claiming-to-be-somalian-are-lying-2163180.html (discussing a report by Ireland's
Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, which found that over half of the asylum
seekers claiming to be from Somalia turned out to be from other African countries).
J,'
Gawronski et al., supranote 18, at 652, 655, 658.
1.15
Id. at 660.
'4 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 75, at Xl fig.31.
Compare Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 69, at 1658 (noting
that 8890 petitions for review of BIA decisions were filed with the circuit courts), with EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 75, at S1 fig.25 (stating that the BIA completed
about 33,102 cases in 2009). The percent of BIA decisions appealed to the federal courts
increased from a historical 5% (before 2002) to approximately 30% in 2005, after the Attorney
General issued a regulation that expanded the BIA's streamlining procedures. EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BIA RESTRUCTURING AND
STREAMLINING PROCEDURES 2 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/06/BIA
StreamliningFactSheet030906.pdf. The change was felt acutely in the Ninth Circuit, where the
number of immigration appeals rose from 2670 before implementation of the reform
regulation to 6583 in fiscal year 2005. Id. The Ninth Circuit reports that the number of BIA
appeals has steadily declined since 2005. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2009), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/Annual
Report2009.pdf. BIA appeals to the Ninth Circuit numbered 3280 in 2009, down almost 25%
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reviewed by a federal judge was just 2%. Thus, in the vast majority of
cases, what happens in immigration court stays in immigration court, and
no one ever sees the transcript. When cases are appealed, the BIA provides
notoriously weak review, often issuing a summary "affirmance without
opinion" under its "streamlined" procedures 48 Researchers have shown
that a decisionmaker's "degree of deliberation will vary as a function of the
individual's desired level of decision confidence." 149 In short, "[w]hen this
criterion is low (i.e., when little deliberation is considered necessary), the
likelihood of automatic biases dictating the final decision should be
greater, compared with when the criterion is high and a wider array of
information ends up being considered." 150 Accordingly, if IJs faced a
greater prospect of judicial review, they would "set a higher threshold for
decision confidence and as a result [would be] more likely to consider a
broader range of information, some of which is likely to contradict the
judgment implied by their implicit associations." 151 Increasing the prospect
of judicial review should therefore lead to implicit associations being less
52
influential in IJs decisionmaking1
B.

Factors That Contribute to Implicit Bias by the Board of Immigration
Appeals

Many of the same factors noted above also apply to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. This section, however, emphasizes those factors that
are unique to the BIA. To begin with, the BIA has an even higher case load
than IJs, as it had thirteen regular members and five temporary members in
2010,153 who decided over 33,000 appeals (down from over 41,000 in 2006),

from the year before. Id.
14'8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2010); see Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2005);
Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (10th Cir. 2004).
144Bodenhausen & Todd, supra note 56, at 285.

150d.
151Id.

15_See id.; see also Schuette & Fazio, supra note 112 (showing that implicit associations play a
greater role when fear of invalidity is low, whereas judgments reflect a wider range of
considerations when fear of invalidity is high).
IF: See Board of Immigration Appeals, EXEC. OFFiCE FOR IMMIGR. REV., http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/fs/biabios.htm (last updated Jan. 2011) (listing biographies of the current permanent
Board members). The Attorney General appointed a new BIA member, Michael J. Peppy, in
February 2011. See News Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, EOIR Announces the
Newest Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Feb. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=34554. Temporary BIA members cannot vote
in en banc cases and have no say as to whether panel decisions become precedential. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(a)(4), (g) (2010).
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which is an average of over 1800 cases per BIA member each year.
Consequently, the BIA has even more limited time than IJs to devote to
deliberation. The streamlined, procedure, mentioned above, whereby one
member of the BIA simply "affirms without opinions" the decision of the
IJ, makes it especially easy for BIA members to avoid conscious
deliberation, because they do not need to articulate their reasoning, engage
in any explicit legal analysis, or persuade any of their peers. 5 Since studies
have long shown that "we have relatively little awareness of how we're
doing what we're doing" 156 and often rely on erroneous intuitive theories
that highlight the importance of irrelevant factors, 5 7 the danger of allowing
legal decisions to be made without explanation should not be underrated.
This danger is especially acute in immigration cases, where the result may
be deportation, a consequence so severe that the Supreme Court has
15 8
recognized it as "the equivalent of banishment or exile."
The paucity of BIA precedents further contributes to reliance on
cognitive shortcuts. If the BIA issued more precedent decisions, individual
Board members would have less leeway in deciding individual cases and
would be more likely to engage in deliberate analysis, drawing on the legal
standards set forth in prior cases and comparing relevant fact patterns. The
American Bar Association's proposals for reforming the immigration court
system specifically mention that the BIA's remarkable rate of adjudication
"has come at a substantial cost, including . . . the lack of precedent
guidance coming from the Board." 519
Last, the range of issues subject to judicial review was greatly limited
by Congress through the 1996 reforms and the REAL ID Act of 2005.160 For

" EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 75, at S1 fig.25; see also Legomsky,
RestructuringImmigration Adjudication, supranote 69, at 1654 (citing similar figures from 2008).

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
156David L. Hamilton, Nonconscious and Automatic Processing: Introduction and Preview, in
SOCIAL COGNITION: KEY READINGS 203,204 (David L. Hamilton ed., 2005) discussing a series of
studies by Nisbett and Wilson from 1977 showing that people do a poor job of explaining how
their judgments are made).
157Id.
15A
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
"I

iS

ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE

IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ES-31

(2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/media/nosearch/
immigration reform executivesummary_012510.authcheckdam.pdf.
10 Illegal Immigration Reform and Inmigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L.
No. 104-208, Div. C § 309(c)(4 ), 110 Stat. 3009-549, 626-27 (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C.
(2006)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 423, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006)); REAL ID Act of 2005 § 106, 8 U.S.C.
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example, federal courts have been stripped of jurisdiction over
discretionary determinations and cases involving a removal order based on
the commission of an aggravated felony, with the exception of
constitutional claims and questions of law. 161 The limited nature of judicial
review contributes to the BIA's low-quality decisions with poorly
articulated reasons. The doctrine of deference to agency determinations
further constrains what the federal courts of appeal are able or willing to
do,162 although certain circuit court judges seem to be compensating for the
BIA's shortcomings by applying a less deferential standard of review than
one might expect. 163 The combination of all these factors creates a situation
that actually discourages detailed deliberation on the part of the BIA and
allows implicit biases to flourish unchecked by explicit cognitive processes.
C. Reforms to Reduce Implicit Bias in Administrative Adjudication
Immigration reform could ameliorate some of the problems noted
above (such as the limited opportunity for deliberate thinking and low
motivation) simply by allocating more resources to immigration courts and
the BIA, thereby increasing their capacity to engage in more conscious
decisionmaking. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010
proposed by Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-VT) attempts to do this by increasing the number of IJs and support
staff over a five-year period.1M While commendable, this proposal does not
go far enough to remedy the structural barriers to more deliberate
decisionmaking. The Act proposes increasing the number of Js by twenty
each year for fiscal years 2011 to 2015 and increasing the support staff for
IJs by eighty each year during the same time period. 165 Since there are

1252 (2006); see David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act:
Habeus Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996-2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75, 82-85, 108-09
(2007).
161See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)-(C) (2006).
102See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We have long
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer .... ).
16 See Cox, supra note 7, at 1672 (describing how Judge Posner's immigration opinions
"exhibit extremely searching review" and "treat immigration authorities with great
skepticism," instead of showing traditional administrative deference). Some scholars have
made persuasive legal arguments against kneejerk deference, especially in asylum cases
where the definition of a refugee is based on an international treaty. See, e.g., Bassina
Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: InternationalistPaths Through and Beyond
Chevron, 60 DUKE L. J. 1059 (2011) (arguing that the doctrine of deference should not be
applied where the agency opinion is in contrast with international law).
1,1 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S. 3932, 111th Cong. § 107 (a)(2) (2010).
165Id.
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currently 262 immigration judges, including the 23 new hires in 2010,166 this
would bring the total to 362 IJs by the end of 2015. If the number of
completed immigration court cases remained roughly the same (around
287,207 in 2010),167 the increase in IJs would reduce the case load to about
793 cases per year per judge, which would allow more time for deliberation
and possibly lead to higher quality decisions.
The proposed reforms, however, not only increase the number of IJs
but also substantially increase the number of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") and Customs and Border Protection ("CBP")
personnel, which will lead to more people being placed in removal
proceedings.16 A 44% increase in newly filed cases occurred between 2000
and 2005, which the Executive Office for Immigration Review attributed to
"several factors, including enhanced border and interior enforcement
actions and changes in immigration laws and regulations." 169 One can
expect a similar surge in removal proceedings to occur again if additional
resources are devoted to border enforcement.
While a legalization program might arguably reduce the number of
immigration court cases by creating new ways for people to legalize their
status through USCIS and terminating certain removal proceedings, this
argument has serious weaknesses. To begin with, the majority of
individuals removed from the United States are now people with criminal
convictions, due to the Obama Administration's policy of focusing on this
population.170 Since all but the most minor convictions will render aliens
ineligible for Lawful Prospective Immigrant ("LPI") and Blue Card status,
this group would remain in removal proceedings before immigration

166News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office of Immigration Review, The Executive
Office for Immigration Review Swears in 23 New Immigration Judges, Judge Corps Reaches
262 Serving in 59 Immigration Courts (Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/press/2010/ Jlnvestiture11052010.pdf.
1
67EXEC.OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 75, at B7 fig.3.
148'
See S.3932 §§ 101, 102, 106. Specifically, section 101 of the Act requires that ICE have a
total force of 6410 agents to investigate violations of criminal law and 185 worksite
enforcement officers before any Lawful Prospective Immigrants are allowed to adjust their
status, and section 106 would add roughly 800 to 1000 full-time active duty ICE investigators
each year for fiscal years 2011-2012. Id. §§ 101, 106. Moreover, section 101 provides that CBP
must have a total of 21,000 agents trained, hired, and reporting for duty prior to the
adjustment of any LPIs, and section 102 requires DHS to hire, train, and assign to duty 5000
additional CBP officers by September 30, 2013. Id. §§ 101-02.
1'9 GAO REPORT, supra note 86, at 4. The number of newly filed cases increased from 252,000
in 2000 to 363,000 in 2005. Id. In 2010, the total number of matters received by the immigration
courts totaled 392,888. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 75, at B7 fig.3.
1'0 See Fawn Johnson, Deportations Reach All-Time High, NATL J. (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/ns 20101006_5083.php.
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judges. 171
In fiscal year 2010, half of the 392,000 people removed from the United
States were convicted criminals. 172 This represents a significant increase
from prior years, as approximately 33% of aliens removed in 2009, and 29%
of those removed in 2008, had criminal convictions173 Indeed, the
percentage of convicted criminals removed in 2010 is significantly higher
than in any year during the past decade. 74 Moreover, the absolute number
of convicted criminals removed from the United States steadily increased
from 72,061 in 2000 to 128,345 in 2009, and then jumped dramatically to
195,772 in 2010.175 Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano stated
that this represented a 70% increase in criminal proceedings since 2008.176
Since the Obama Administration intends to pursue the policy of focusing
its removal efforts on criminals, immigration courts can predictably expect
more cases each year involving convicted aliens who will not be eligible for
new immigration benefits under the proposed Act. Moreover, the
proposed Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act also increases the
number of ICE officers focused on criminal investigations, which will
compound the number of aliens with convictions placed in removal
proceedings. 177 Given these trends, one cannot count on a legalization
program to counter the rising tide of removal.

"

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006); S. 3932 §§ 476(a)(3)-(4), 501(b)(2)(A)(i).
Obama as Border Cop: He's Deported Record Numbers of Illegal
'-2 See Lourdes Medrano,
Immigrants, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 12, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com[USA/Justice
/2010/0812/Obama-as-border-cop-He-s-deported-record-numbers-of-ilegal-immigrants.
7,'In 2009, a total of 393,289 aliens were removed, 128,345 (33%) of whom had criminal
convictions. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2009
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 103 (Aug. 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/oisyb_2009.pdf. In 2008, a total of 358,886 aliens were
removed, 105,103 (29%) of whom had criminal convictions. Id.
174In 2007, a total of 319,382 aliens were removed, 102,394 (32%) of whom had criminal
convictions. Id. at 100. In 2006, 280,974 were removed, 98,490 (35%) of whom had criminal
convictions. Id. In 2005, a total of 246,431 aliens were removed, 92,221 (37%) of whom had
criminal convictions. Id. In 2004, a total of 240,665 aliens were removed, 92,380 (38%) of whom
had criminal convictions. Id. In 2003, a total of 211,098 aliens were removed, 83,731 (40%) of
whom had criminal convictions. Id. at 97. In 2002, a total of 165,168 aliens were removed,
73,429 (44%) of whom had criminal convictions. Id. In 2001, 189,026 aliens were removed,
73,298 (39%) of whom had criminal convictions. Id. In 2000, a total of 188,467 aliens were
removed, 72,061 (38%) of whom had criminal convictions. Id.
17 See Raisa Camargo, Criminal Deportations Reach Record High; Deportations up 70 Percent
Since Obama Took Office, LATIN AM. NEWS DISPATCH, http://latindispatch.com/2010/10/12/
criminal-deportations-reach-record-high-deportations-up-7-percent-since-bama-tok-office
(last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
76Id.

17, See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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Another weakness in the argument that a legalization program will
reduce the caseload of IJs is that it overlooks the ways in which such a
program might directly contribute to individuals being placed in removal
proceedings. Individuals who apply for legalization and are denied by
USCIS may end up in removal proceedings. While the proposed Act, like
the 1986 amnesty under IRCA, includes confidentiality provisions
designed to alleviate concerns that information provided in the
applications would be used to prosecute or deport applicants, there are
exceptions to these provisions, including cases involving misrepresentation
or fraud. 78
In light of these issues, the Act's provisions for increasing the number
of IJs, BIA staff attorneys, and support staff do not appear adequate to
ensure time for conscious, deliberate consideration of cases and to improve
motivation and morale among immigration adjudicators.
Even if increasing EOIR's capacity along the proposed lines succeeds in
reducing workloads, stress, and burnout, it is not the optimal approach to
reducing implicit bias within EOIR, as it would not address the lack of
independence or low risk of judicial review. Actually restructuring the
immigration court system as an Article I court with a single level of review
79
by an Article III court along the lines proposed by Stephen Legomsky
would have a much more profound effect. This proposed structural reform
would increase the independence of IJs by removing them from the
Department of Justice, improve their sense of esteem and their pride in
their place within the judiciary, set a higher standard for decisionmaking,
eliminate problems with the BIA, and expand the scope of judicial review,
as issues currently reviewed by the BIA would be reviewed by federal
judges, all of which would help reduce implicit bias for the reasons
discussed above. Thus, structural reform of the immigration adjudication
process should play an integral role in discussions of comprehensive
immigration reform.
If eliminating the BIA proves too problematic, restoring review by
three-member panels in all cases, disposing of the "affirmative without
opinion" procedure, applying a more searching standard of review to
findings of facts (e.g. de novo rather than clearly erroneous), and
increasing the BIA's diversity by appointing more female members and
people of color could help reduce implicit bias. 180 The gender balance of the
BIA, in particular, merits closer examination in exploring ways to reduce

178See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S. 3932, 111th Cong. § 504(d)
(2010).
I, See generally Legomsky, RestructuringImmigration Adjudication, supra note 69, at 1678-87.
'10 Cf.Rachlinsky et al, supra note 55, at 1231 (exploring how altering courtroom practices
could reduce unconscious bias by trial judges).
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implicit bias, since female IJs grant asylum at a rate that is 44% higher than
their male colleagues. 8' A balanced, three-member panel that issues
written opinions would help check the impact of implicit bias on behavior,
encouraging individual panel members to explicitly override their implicit
82
biases by conferring with each other and articulating their reasoning.
While these reforms would not change the complexity of immigration
cases or the challenging nature of credibility assessments, they would
change the context in which such decisions are made. The strong
normative structure and clear guidelines for appropriate conduct
associated with an Article I court would help reduce the influence of
implicit bias on all types of decisions by IJs, as would review by a balanced,
three-member panel of the BIA. 183 The federal courts of appeal, Congress,
or the Department of Justice could also establish more clear and consistent
rules for making credibility determinations that would help reduce the
influence of implicit bias in this area. 184 In addition, IJs should receive
trainings about the ways that implicit bias can cloud their judgments,
especially their credibility assessments, so that they at least become aware
of potential pitfalls, such as biased interpretations of facial expressions or
ambiguous behavior. Adopting clear codes of conduct and conducting
annual performance evaluations of IJs and the BIA could also help reduce
bias.
In sum, increasing the number of IJs and support staff is a necessary
first step that would be even more effective when coupled with
restructuring the immigration court system, but these reforms alone may
not be sufficient to reduce the impact of implicit bias on immigration
adjudication. "Even with greater resources, judges will still resort to
cognitive shortcuts." 185Judges must become aware of the impact of implicit
bias in order to question the soundness of their decisions and make the
effort to render more impartial judgments.' 86 Reforms such as "exposing
judges to stereotype-incongruent models, providing testing and training,
auditing judicial decisions, and altering courtroom practices" could all help

191
See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 72, at 342-43.
18-See Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 8-9 (2007) (proposing a "dual-process model of
judging" whereby "judges make initial intuitive judgments" that they "might (or might not)
override with deliberation").
MsSee supra text accompanying notes 34-35.

'1See Kagan, supra note 134, at 399-403 (proposing a framework for analyzing credibility in
a more objective, reliable and reviewable manner); cf.Guthrie et al., supra note 131, at 828-29
(recommending judges and legislators to craft legal rules that minimize the adverse effects
that cognitive illusions on judgments").
185 Guthrie et al., supra note 131, at 820.
1i6
See id.
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reduce implicit bias. 187 Further exploration of such reforms, specifically in
the context of immigration adjudication, is necessary in order to provide
individuals facing deportation, potentially to a country where they face
persecution, a fair and impartial hearing.
CONCLUSION
This Article examined the role of implicit bias in immigration court and
the BIA, highlighting various factors that contribute to its influence over
administrative decisionmaking. The discussion sets forth a roadmap for
further analysis, raising the importance of implicit bias in a new context
that legal scholars have not yet analyzed.
In addition, the Article suggested some ways that immigration reform
can help reduce implicit bias. These strategies range from relatively simple
measures such as: increasing the number and resources of IJs to allow time
for thoughtful deliberation, conducting regular evaluations of their
performance, and providing them with trainings to make them more aware
of the impact of implicit bias, to more complex reforms, such as:
restructuring the entire immigration court system or even just the BIA's
procedures and creating rules that make challenging issues such as
credibility determinations more objective and reliable. Such reforms can
cumulatively have a powerful impact on how implicit attitudes influence
immigration adjudication.
While our government no longer uses the colorful language quoted by
the Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case regarding how the country
"has no room outside of its prisons or almshouses for depraved and
incorrigible criminals or hopelessly dependent paupers who may have
become a pest or burden, or both, to their own country," 188 such antiforeigner sentiments unfortunately still influence how judges make
decisions. We cannot, therefore, hope to tackle the complex issue of
comprehensive immigration reform without first deepening our
understanding of how both explicit and implicit forms of prejudice shape
the way that judges respond to immigrants. This Article represents an
initial effort to analyze some of these challenging issues from a legal
perspective, but further interdisciplinary research would help elucidate the
ways that various legal reforms can promote more conscious and
egalitarian adjudication.

17 Rachlinsky et al., supra note 55, at 1226.

1 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).

